Searle's Status Functions, part one

In Making the Social World, philosopher John Searle argues that language is “an extension of biologically basic, prelinguistic forms of intentionality,” and human reality is rooted in and a product of the natural world.  Humans live in physical reality, and language is representative of that reality.  Therefore, we must approach language as a natural phenomenon.  Searle believes some philosophers have erred in separating language from its foundation in biology and in reducing intentionality to simply mental constructions of belief and desire.  He argues that intentionality is part of our biology, particular through our perceptions, which then affect our actions.  “The biologically more basic forms of relating to reality,” he writes, “are in our plans (prior intentions), our tryings (intentions-in-action), our perceivings, and our rememberings.  In these we have both the causal and the representational component” (39).

Searle attempts in his book to clarify the philosophical underpinnings of social interactions and institutions by way of linguistic deontolgy—our obligations to one another.  In other words, humans are able to function in social environments because of language, and perhaps we could not understand human metaphysics without it (61).